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istory teaches. It allows us
to see people and events
through the lens of time;
compare and contrast them
with those of our current
world; and, most importantly, think
deeply and honestly about what
kinds of people we are and should
be. Particularly, as attorneys sworn to
law and justice, history illuminates
for us what kind of society we must
foster and build. For these and other
reasons we look forward to The Advocate issues sponsored by the Idaho
Legal History Society. Our recent
reward was the Society's sponsored
issue in November/December 2016.

We best exist as people and serve as attorneys when we build
upon these insights to ferret out prejudice, racism, bigotry, hate,
and a bias-springing refusal to extend common decency
and empathy to the "other:'

History's call to action

The thing about learning from
people and events long dead to us is
that, beyond the self-circumscribed
joy of learning, the relevance and
power of that learning only come
What history can teach
to
light through our introspection
us about ourselves
followed by action. Without action,
There, our colleague Richard learning means nothing.
Eppink's article, Let Us Now Praise
Here, we have the opportunity
Famous Men: Why Are Nearly All of and duty to inform, empower, and
Idaho's Most Lauded Lawyers White elevate ourselves and our practice by
Men?, 1 pains us with shocking sto- considering, integrating, and then
ries of racial and ethnic atrocities acting upon the lessons from Mr. Epfrom Idaho's past, ones that went
pink's article. It is especially imporunpunished by the law and ones
tant that we do so in view of current
that were so heinous as to be blotted
manifestations of prejudice, discrimfrom past historical accounts. That
ination, and hate against the "other?'3
history teaches us about those days'
Whether in public service or priprofound xenophobia and blatant
vate
work as employment attorneys,
personal and institutional prejudice
against people not of European de- litigators, or corporate counsel, we
best promote justice and the rule of
scent.2
After the shock, however, Mr. Ep- law when we educate ourselves, espink's article allows us to compare pecially about our own selves, and
the view of "the other" today in our inform our practice about aversive
law, our profession, and ourselves. racism. Aversive racism and other
4
With introspection and courage, our forms of unjust bias are real and
study of history calls us to reaffirm deeply corrosive to our society and
integrity, honesty, and justice as our legal system and, most of all, destrucguiding principl.es. These are great tive to those against whom we are
and real rewards of the histories biased. 5 We best exist as people and
shone upon by Mr. Eppink.
serve as attorneys when we build

upon these insights to ferret out
prejudice, racism, bigotry, hate, and
a bias-springing refusal to extend
common decency and empathy to
the "other:'
In the end, our actions are all that
speak for us and for our profession.
Our actions on behalf of humanity,
our commitment to justice and ethical integrity, and our enlightened
practice of law are the enduring legacies. Notable examples that belong
to history include Judge Sergio Gutierrez, Dick Fields, Ernesto Sanchez,
Dean and former Justice Cathy Silak,
and so many other of our esteemed
colleagues. . Let us learn from them
and others because all lives matter
and all lives can elevate us, especially
our own.

Aversive racism:
Pretending not to hate
To support this journey of contemplation into professional responsibility and legal practice, I offer a
brief introduction to aversive racism,
the "dominant model of prejudice"
in the legal literature. 6 I cite to exemplar references in which the U.S.
Supreme Courf and other tribunalss
and the judiciary,9 academy, 10 and

bar 11 have applied the theory of aversive racism and related species of implicit, but still destructive and often
deadly prejudice.
The theory of aversive racism, also
called symbolic or contemporary
racism, was introduced more than 30
years ago in 1986 by John E Dovidio,
now of Yale University, and Samuel
L. Gaertner, now distinguished professor emeritus of the University of
Delaware. 12 Since then, theyt 3 and
others have been examining and developing our understanding of such
covert prejudice and how such prejudiced people and systems perceive
and behave toward the "other;' 14 as
compared to the blatant perceptions
and overt actions are motivated by
so-called "traditional" prejudice. 15
Professor Jody David Armour of the
University of Southern California's
Gould School of Law explains:
The theory of aversive racism
begins with the proposition
that most Americans are highly
committed to egalitarian values. Therefore, they desire to
maintain an egalitarian, nonprejudiced self-image. This desire causes them to express nonprejudiced personal beliefs.
Such professed nonprejudiced
beliefs are not to be confused
with genuine - i.e., well-internalized - nonprejudiced beliefs,
for deep down 'aversive racists
believe in white superiority'
and 'do not want to associate
with blacks? Desperately clinging to their egalitarian, nonprejudiced values and self-image, aversive racists repress their
negative feelings and beliefs
about blacks. Lawrence refers
to these repressed anti-black
beliefs as 'hidden prejudice;r i
and offers a Freudian theory
of unconscious motivation to

explain how 'we all harbor
prejudiced attitudes that are
kept from our consciousness?
Moreover, since aversive racists
do not recognize their antiblack attitudes, the prospects
for prejudice reduction are
particularly dim. Here the pessimism of the aversive racism
model asserts itself. Writing
from this perspective, Professor
Peggy Davis observes, "it is dit:
ficult to change an attitude that
is unacknowledged. Thus, 'like
a virus that mutates into new

appears to be prevalent in the
modern workplace. Because of
its subconscious and implicit
nature, it is especially difficult for the existing Title VII
structure to handle. This type
of racism can offer advantages
for members of the dominant
group, boosting their self-esteem and promoting feelings
of authority and superiority.
In a more tangible sense, aversive racial discrimination offers
economic advantages to whites
and allows them to maintain
dominance in the workplace. 17

Lawrence refers to these
repressed anti-black beliefs as
'hidden prejudice; and offers a
Freudian theory of unconscious
motivation to explain how 'we all
harbor prejudiced attitudes that
are kept from our consciousness:t

Aversive racism is subtle and
nearly subliminal. It is indirectly
expressed and often camouflaged in
prejudice-neutral trappings or even
symbolic conduct. 18 Nevertheless, its
corrosive consequences are as significant and grave as those of traditional
racism. 19 Just as traditional racism
never seems to die, research overwhelmingly shows that the aversive
forms of prejudice are deeply persistent.20

Our higher selves, our higher service

forms, old-fashioned prejudice
seems to have evolved into a
new type that is, at least temporarily, resistant to traditional ...
remedies?" 16
In a civil rights and employment
context, aversive racism:
is characterized by subtle, often
unintentional, forms of bias
on the part of whites. They often believe that they are acting
free from prejudice, and may
be unaware that their decision
making is to the detriment of
black workers. Aversive racism

Although most often examined
in terms of racial or ethnic distinctions between people of European
descent and so-called people of color, the concepts underlying aversive
racism apply to other forms of bias
and prejudices we may have against
women and others. The unifying
theme is that we may be unaware
of our unjust prejudices and even
be emphatically adamant that we
are not prejudiced. Despite this, our
beliefs, perceptions, and behavior toward "the other" may reveal the true
parameters of our darkness 21 and put
the lie to our feigned protestations
of justice and equality. 22
The truth can be hard to accept
and none more difficult than IaThe Advocate· March/April2017
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mented ones about ourselves. If we
have courage, however, and are committed to our integrity and competency21 as people and attorneys, the
pursuit of truth in our self-.examination24 and in examining the facts and
circumstances of the cases before us
will lead us, always, to the highest
callings of our lives, our profession,
and our service to our clients. Let us
be worthy of history.

During her Senate confirmation for appointment to the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, then-Florida Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett
was lauded for her recognition of aversive racism and its taint
in judicial proceedings in a capital case.

Endnotes
1. See 59 ADVOCATE 43 (Nov./Dec. 2016).
2. Persons of European descent have suffered prejudice within the American legal system in the past. See, e.g., Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22, 36 (U.S. 1921)
(certified from Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit) (holding, in relevant part,
that affidavit of prejudice sufficed to
invoke applicable law under which defendants sought to disqualify judge and
challenged judge "had no lawful right or
power to preside as judge on the trial of
defendants"). In that oft-cited case, the
affidavit averred this traditionally prejudiced diatribe by the challenged judge:
One must have a very judicial
mind, indeed, not be to prejudiced
against the German Americans in
this country. Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty. This defendant
is the kind of a man that spreads
this kind of propaganda and it
has been spread until it has affected practically all the Germans
in this country. This same kind of
excuse of the defendant offering
to protect the German people is
the same kind of excuse offered by
the pacifists in this country, who are
against the United States and have
the interests of the enemy at heart
by defending that thing they call
the Kaiser and his darling people.
You are the same kind of a man
that comes over to this country
from Germany to get away from
the Kaiser and war. You have become a citizen of this country and
lived here as such, and now when
this country is at war with Germany
you seek to undermine the country
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which gave you protection. You are
of the same mind that practically
all the German-Americans are in
this country, and you call yourselves German-Americans. Your
hearts are reeking with disloyalty.
I know a safeblower, he is a friend
of mine, who is making a good
soldier in France. He was a bank
robber for nine years, that was
his business in peace time, and
now he is a good soldier, and as
between him and this defendant, I
prefer the safeblower.
Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28-29
(U.S. 1921) (emphasis supplied).
3. See EDDIE S. GLAUDE, JR., DEMOCRACY IN
BLACK: How RAcE STILL ENSLAVES THE AMERICAN
SouL (2016); Eddie Glaude, Democracy
in Black, Interview of Professor Glaude
by Derek McGinty, The Diane Rehm
Show (WAMU, Washington, D.C., Jan.
13, 2016), https://thedianerehmshow.
org/shows/2016-0 1-13/eddie-glaudedemocracy-in-black.
4. See Molly O'Leary, What Do You Mean
I'm Biased, 55 ADVOCATE 10 (2012) (President's message}.
5. See, e.g., Jun Yu v. Idaho State University, Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Leave to Amend Complaint, 4, 11-12
& 25-28 & First Amended Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial, 1111157 & 352. Case
No. 4:15-cv-00430-REB (D. Idaho, filed
with motion on Apr. 8, 2016). The author
serves as co-counsel with Mr. Ronaldo A.
Coulter representing Mr. Yu in this ongoing litigation.
6. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision Makers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REv. 733,

746 & n.58 ( 1995) (Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 156465 (1989); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, The ld,
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317, 335-36 (1987); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MICH.l.REv.1611, 1649(1985)).

7. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief of the American Psychological
Association, 2014 U.S. Briefs **28-**41
(Nov. 2, 2015).
8. See, e.g., Salami v. Von Maur, Inc., 838
N.W. 2d 680 (Iowa Ct. Appeals, July 24,
2013); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES IN ExPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 14-15 (2004)
(citations omitted). During her Senate
confirmation for appointment to the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
then-Florida Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett was lauded for her recognition of
aversive racism and its taint in judicial
proceedings in a capital case. There, she
wrote:
The Court found that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
is subject to the constraints of
the Equal Protection Clause when
there is some basis for believing
that the challenges are used in a
racially discriminatory manner.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Batson
recognized the invidious nature
of discrimination. [See Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-96, 106 S.
Ct. 1712, 1721-23, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
(1986).] Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, noted that discrimination is not often blatantly
expressed, and in many cases it is
subliminal:

"A prosecutor's own conscious
or unconscious racism may lead
him easily to the conclusion that
a prospective black juror is 'sullen;
or 'distant; a characterization that
would not have come to his mind
if a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to
accept such an explanation as well
supported:' ld. at 106, 106 S. Ct.
at 1728 (Marshall, J. concurring).
Studies of unconscious racism
have shown that the perpetrator
does not feel particularly punitive
toward minorities, rather, he or
she wants to remain distant and is
less likely to feel empathy because
of the distance.... While society
has largely rejected blatant stereotypes and overt discrimination,
more subtle forms of racism are increasing: "A burgeoning literature
documents the rise of the 'aversive'
racist, a person whose ambivalent
racial attitudes leads him or her to
deny his or her prejudice and express it indirectly, covertly, and often unconsciously:'[).
Discrimination, whether conscious
or unconscious, cannot be permitted in Florida courts. As important
as it is to ensure a jury selection
process free from racial discrimination, it is infinitely more important to ensure that the state is not
imposing the ultimate penalty of
death in a racially discriminatory
manner.
Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Foster v. Florida, Supreme Court of Florida,
No. 76639 (Oct. 22, 1992), rehearing denied (Apr. 1, 1993) (citation omitted), in
Ex. 1, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess., 140 Cong.
Rec. S. 1834 (Feb. 24, 1994) (Nomination of Rosemary Barkett to Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit) (Senator Bob
Graham); see also 103rd Con g., 2d Sess.,
140 Cong. Rec. S. 1935 (Feb. 25, 1994)
(Statement on Nomination of Rosemary
Barkett to Court of Appeals for the 11th
Circuit) (Senator Graham adding inadvertently omitted page to Chief Justice
Barkett's concurrence & dissent).

Mexico-born of Syrian immigrants, Justice Barkett, now a Judge on the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, undoubtedly knew directly of what she spoke,
and her recognition of and certain experience with racism illustrate the inestimable value of diversity on the bench
and at the bar. See Advocate 43 (Nov./
Dec., 2016) at 44-45.
9. See Hon. Jerome P. Vanora, Judicial
Disqualification for Personal Bias in New
York State, 8 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JuDGEs(1988) (discussing judges' personal bias,
i.e., bias stemming from an extrajudicial
source, as bases for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 144), http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol8/iss2/3.
10. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCEs IN
ExPERIMENTAL SociAL PsYCHOLOGY 1, 14-15 &
38-39 (2004) (citations omitted).
11. See generally, e.g., Sarah Q. Simmons,
Litigators Beware: Implicit Bias, 59 ADvoCATE 35 (Mar./ Apr. 2016); Deborah A. Ferguson, ABA Delegates to Examine Courtroom Bias, 58 ADVOCATE 40 (2015).
12. See, e.g.,John F. Dovidio & Samuel
L. Gaertner, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DisCRIMINATION, AND RAcISM (Dovidio & Gaertner, eds., 1986); see
also http://psychology.yale.edu/people/
john-dovidio and https://www.psych.
udel.edu/people/full-list-searchable/
gaertner (curricula vitae).
13. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADvANCEs IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Fox, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEX IS 100366 at *52-*58 (examining expert testimony of Professor Leslie
Wade Zorwick on stereotyping, prejudice, identity, "white flight;'"code words;'
"at risk communities;' and concepts of
"moral credentials" and aversive racism)
(rejecting motion in limine as to same),
Case No. 3:09-CV-0756 (M.D. Tenn., filed
Sept. 23, 201 0).
15. Traditional or "'dominative racists;
persons who express bigotry and hatred
openly, are less common than they were
twenty-five years ago, they have been
replaced, in substantial measure, by
closet or 'aversive' racists, persons who
continue to hold negative stereotypes

of minorities and wish to avoid them:'
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Amicus Brief of the American Psychological
Association, 2014 U.S. Briefs **34 (Nov. 2,
2015) (quoting Sheri Lynn Johnson, The
Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 21, 75 (1993)); see also Leslie Wade
Zorwick, Henricks College, Old FashiQned
and Contemporary Prejudice, https:/I
quizlet.com/1 0345722/old-fashionedand-contemporary-prejudice-zorwick1-flash-cards/ (Professor Zorwick's online flashcard study tool for distinguishing aversive and traditional prejudice).
16. Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:
Helping Legal Decision Makers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REv.
733, 746-747 (1995) (citations omitted);
see also Omar Ha-Redeye, Media Narratives in Times of Turmoil: Depictions
of Minorities in Canada Post 9/7 7, Annual Meeting of the World Institute for
Research and Publication - Law (presented June 4, 2010), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1526867.
17. Damon Ritenhouse, A Primer on Title
VII: Part Two, American Bar Ass'n, GP SoLO
EREPORT (Jim Schwartz, ed., Feb. 2013)
(citations omitted), http://www.america n ba r.org/ publications/g psol o _ereport/2013/february_2013/primer _title_
vii_part_two.html.
18. See AMERICAN BAR AssociATlON, Division
for Public Education, <http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/
initiatives_awards/students_in_action/
debate_hate.html> ("Hate speech is
speech that offends, threatens, or insults
groups, based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits:'); THE FEDERAL BuREAU oF
INVESTIGATION, Hate Crimes Add an Element
of Bias to Traditional Crimes- And the Mixture is Toxic to our Communities <http:/I
www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes>; R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
Minnesota, United States Supreme Court
Amicus Brief of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, et a/.,
1991 WL 11003964 at *19 (filed Aug.
23, 1991) (discussing special meanings
of symbolic conduct in hate crimes)
("These symbols carry messages replete
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with animosity that is rooted in the past
and extends into the present; they trigger collective memories that are both
painful and frightening:').
19. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADvANcEs IN
EXPERIMENTAL SociAL PsYCHOLOGY 1, 3 (2004)
(citations omitted).
20. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Amicus Brief of the American Psychological Association, 2014 U.S. Briefs
**29 (Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Texas Dep't of
Housing & Comm. Affairs v. Inclusive Comms. Pro}., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015)
(regarding value of disparate impact
analysis in exposing and countering "unconscious prejudices").

15 (2007) (color-blind paradigm as fallacy), cited in Adele, supra note[#], at 106.
23. See Aastha Madaan, Cultural Competency and the Practice of Law in the
21st Century, American Bar Ass'n, 30
PROBATE & PRoPERTY MAGAZINE 29 (Mar./
Apr. 2016) (discussing cultural competency under ABA Model of Professional
Conduct Rules 1.1 & 1.3), http://www.
a me rica n ba r.org/p ubI icatio ns/probate_property_magazine_2012/20 16/
march_apri1_20 16/20 16_aba_rpte_pp_
v30 2 article_madaan_cultural_com-

21. See Margo Louise Foster, There Was

Why? Mental Disability in the Negligent
Infliction of Psychiatric Injury and the Decisions in Mustapha v. Culligan, 14 APPEAL
37, 63-65 (2009) (discussing "claimant as
other").
22. See Nadya A. Fouad & Patricia Arredondo, BEcoMING CuLTURALLY ORIENTED: PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR PSYCHOLOGISTS AND EDUCATORS
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Stephen C. Smith, former Chairman of the
Washington State Bar Association Disciplinary
Board, is now accepting referrals for attorney
disciplinary investigations and proceedings in
Washington, Idaho, Hawaii, and Guam.
208.388.4990
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24. See Andrea A. Curcio, Addressing Barriers to Culture Sensibility Learning: Lessons from Social Cognition Theory, 15 NEVADA L. JouHNAL 537, 545-56 (2015), http:/ I
ssrn.com/abstract=2670820.
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